Introduction
The dominant trends in Europe
Reasons of negative factors
What can be done about all these problems
What might they be?
Introduction
Legitimacy and Efficiency – the unrealizable aim. So it’s usually an imperfect balancing act. But now, EU looks very bad on both. UK better, especially because the systemic claim to legitimacy theoretically seems dubious. Yet if it’s accepted, then OK.
Former a function of : (a) institutions created and their interaction; (b) the mechanisms used for consultation; (c) the way people are selected; (d) their behavior when in office
But this is only acceptable if broader methods of dialogue are permitted, including freedom of expression
The level at which particular decisions can be taken is similarly critical
Finally, the external (to the territory considered) constraints matter greatly, especially re Brexit
So all of these count in any assessment of whether or not there is democracy
Participation is at least as important as representation – we all want to represent ourselves
Efficiency matters, for reasons of ethics, accountancy, time and responsiveness
Decades back the subcontracting of economic functions was thought to be a means of increasing efficiency but the results have been, at best, very mixed
In the UK, the record is especially bad with transport, health services, housing, and education. These are the 4 things that matter most to the large majority of the population which is on average to low incomes
Summed together, the direct outlays on the top 2 items perhaps account for some 30% of the average household bill. Health and education are together <10%. But their significance is much greater. Housing and transport affect heavily the current standard of life. Health coverage provides protection and psychological security. Education is the key to sustainability
What have been dominant trends in EU?
First, secular decline in electoral participation in most countries and at most levels
Second, secular drift in the ability of standard political parties to represent the real concerns of people in a fast changing social and economic environment (SLOW ECONOMIC GROWTH DOES NOT EQUATE TO SLOW ECONOMIC CHANGE – ON THE CONTRARY, TECHNOLOGICAL, ACTIVITY AND SECTORAL SHIFTS HAVE BEEN ENORMOUS WHILE OVERALL GROWTH HAS REMAINED AT HISTORICALLY FAIRLY LOW LEVELS)
Third, sharp rise in financial costs of the political process and an unhealthy linkage of politics, patronage and power
Fourth, dramatic shift in media communications, with accent on sound bites rather than policies. Fiction rather than facts, whimsy rather than thought. This seems to fit with “memory destruction”. What you said yesterday does not count
Fifth, growth of single issue movements
The adversarial relationship of politics to society. Instead of dialogue about how to improve things, the core political groups and institutions consider themselves the true carriers of the flame, and seek to ward off the criticisms and/or wait for them to die out
In UK, the political groups probably think they have achieved many things. Examples would be: treatment of Scotland; treatment of Wales; many alterations to social laws and norms; environment; even funding of sport through national lottery
Yet the focus has been on things which have at best an indirect impact on the economy.
In both the UK and the EU, the economy plays a far greater role in perceptions than the political groups seem to consider. All historically leading political groups accepted (even if reluctantly) neo-liberalism. Its likely effects, in terms of financial focus and ever greater chasms among the population, were not difficult to fathom, but people went on. It was under a so-called “left” government that the financial crisis hit the UK. So the new movements had a platform on which to build an opposition
Efficiency can be measured in all kinds of ways. Certainly, the time taken to push through legislation is on the increase in the larger countries.
The ex Washington consensus people would look at economic measures, and claim that governments have mostly not been good at reform (interpreted in the Washington sense). But resistance is to be expected by those who suffer
The difference is that the neoliberals take initiatives, the rest are fighting a rearguard action to hold on to what they have. Top down has not gone down, and very few move off the bottom
International institutions and agreements have severely cramped government freedom of action. Too much clubbing has become a drug, and now nations cannot shake off the effects – especially because nobody wants to treat those effects
In the EU its administration (the Commission) is seen as a significant negative factor. There are several reasons
First, it has the sole (?)power to initiate laws. Although in fact many other administrations effectively do something similar, the fact that such power is not enshrined in the statutes is a considerable perception advantage
Second, it is perceived as large. This is not in fact true, if calculated in terms of the work it is supposed to accomplish
Third, the salary and related conditions are seen as extravagant
Fourth, it is seen as inefficient and often producing poor work
Fifth, there are frequent cases where corruption and unethical behavior come to light. In most other member states (though not all) the lack of ethics is linked almost exclusively (at least in the public realm) with politicians
This problem scarcely exists in the UK, where administrations per se are felt to work pretty well. If there are times when they seem slow, then the public believes poor regulation is to blame, not the quality, energy and honesty of the public servants
What can be done about all these problems (that mainly appear to affect the EU rather than the UK)?
The first step surely must be to reassess the EU’s “o’er whelming ambition”. Since the end of the 1980s, it has talked (and acted) only in terms of aiming for more – members, powers, capacity to control. That perspective must change. The cocoon in which it has operated must be broken. The world has altered irreversibly. The problem sets of today require cooperation in many cases, but they do not require homogeneisation nor do they require one size fits all. It is not that the EU has been unwilling to look at a range of options (the Commission has, in several areas, been quite good in this respect), but that it has usually sought to distill the range of options into a single remedy
The second step is, consistent with the first, for the EU to stop preaching. Deliverers of sermons have a track record of finishing up badly, not only when (as is mostly the case) they are wrong (Savonarola) but also when they are right (Giordano Bruno). The EU has acquired a theological air that helps nobody. This is all the stranger since the catechism approach to policy has coincided with an epoch where the EU is at great pains to emphasize that it is ecumenical, or non sacra, in the extreme
Step three is to focus on the large and not the small. The subsidiarity principle was supposed to be at the heart of the policy approach. It should return there, by the expedient of concentrating commission efforts on a very limited set of big issues.
What might they be?
First, ensuring that a sensible welfare state arrangement be firmly held across the EU. That one matter alone will go a huge distance in calming criticism. For in recent years the welfare signpost has dropped out of sight. To do this will mean taking a number of actions that stop further erosion of this goal. These actions will affect budgetary processes at national levels, trade agreements, labor market changes, health system reforms and several other things.
Second, recognizing that the EU has limited means, and must cut the cloth accordingly. This will oblige the EU to put its own citizens first. Acceptance of people from abroad should be done in the context of international agreements regarding human rights. Asylum is one thing, economic migration is another. Mostly, the countries that now refuse a quota system are those that are economically weaker. To carry out this refocus, foreign policy will have to move towards tough love. This needs to be said up front, not brought in at the last moment through desperate attempts to negotiate with other countries.
Third, taking strong measures with respect to internal security. Here the individual countries must start to cooperate. It is paradoxical in the extreme that so much effort is placed on spreading all kinds of schemes across the continent when an absolutely core obligation of nation states is being so poorly fulfilled
Fourth, to appreciate that foreign policy will continue to be the real prerogative of member states.
Fifth, to dialogue intensively all across the EU about the actual responsibilities of member states. The emphasis on what you can do rather than what you can get needs to be underlined
Sixth, shift away from the Germany/France axis. That has outlived its cherished position at the heart of everything. The strange mix of orders from the former, and tolerated disobedience from the latter, has left a pungent odor in the corridors of Europe. The smell will not be dissipated until the behavior has altered
Seventh, to recognize that economic advance (whether measured as GDP growth, some more sophisticated measure of growth, or profound alterations in ways of life) comes when human beings and groups have the maximum freedom to pursue their ideas and experiment. In short, the EU can best help by providing some support and minimizing regulation.
Indeed, regulation is also best served by allowing people and communities to do what they see as best. Of course, regulation designed to curb major abuses and shore up systemic weaknesses (as is the case in the financial sector) is a positive. Even there, professional malfaiteurs (a group that includes several institutions and is supported by their lawyers) will always succeed in avoiding some of the penalties. So be it. The EU, or any other entity, cannot do it all nor should it pretend to do so
All of this comes to saying that the EU must accept that, at least for a long future, it has come up against its own limits to growth.
Achievement of this perspective shift depends critically on behavior of the major countries, the ones that, for the last sixty years, have always set the agenda. For them, there has been a positive correlation between a greater extension of the EU and a greater extension of their own power. Indeed, the former has been a very useful veil behind which the latter could grow. Until recently, others in the EU were content to go along with this. Essentially, they were bought off, and were ready to accept the trade
In the future, that cannot be the case. This implies action by all the parties. Those who have been calling the shots will be less able to do so, while those who have been passive will have to do much more for themselves.
Curiously enough, it is by the individual nations becoming more autonomous (which is not at all the same as the ridiculous “take back control” of the Brexiteers) that the whole (the EU) will become stronger. Think of a symphony orchestra. All parts must play together for the overall music to impress. Certainly, individual instruments may come to the fore at certain moments, yet the harmony remains. That is a very different kind of music to one where there is a soloist and the orchestra simply accompanies. Thus far, Europe has played the second kind of music. In the future, it must return to full symphonies.
We are looking to the Pastoral of Beethoven, not the Winterreise of Schubert. If not, then we might finish with the Todesliede of Mahler. We customarily begin the year with the Neujahreskonzert of Vienna – and the star performer there is always the orchestra.
