Part 2: “The Program”
Managing the Conservative Party and Achieving Political Dominance
The Future of the UK and Constitutional Architecture
Arrangements with the EU
Arrangements with the Rest of the World
Future Policies and “Liberation”
Managing the Conservative Party and Achieving Political Dominance
The events since the 2016 referendum have given the maximum space and opportunity for all the divides within the conservative party to be displayed. Bojo has become Prime Minister at the moment when the party crisis has reached its apogee. He in fact has deliberately poured oil on the fire by menacing more than 20 MPs with deselection for the next general elections on the grounds that they have voted against him in sundry parliamentary motions (of which he has lost a high proportion in a very short time). Immediately after doing that, however, he has made overtures to indicate that it is not his intention or wish that the party rip itself asunder. The aim appears to be to try and use the paroxysms of Brexit to make the party politicians decide quickly where they want to go with their future political ambitions – will they stick with the conservatives or will they go elsewhere?
Bojo is probably confident that the response of many or most of them to the question will be to stay with the party. The reason for this is in the morphology of the overall party position in the UK. Put in the simplest terms, that morphology is this. Once some kind of arrangement related with Brexit is made, the Brexit Party is expected to wither and disappear. More importantly, Nigel Farage will go off screen. He is the only political figure that vies with Bojo for media coverage. There is the additional advantage for Bojo that Nigel Farage will never occupy a position of political responsibility. He has always seen himself as primarily a music hall turn (though he usually appears in somewhat run down premises located in places which have seen better days). He will never sully that reputation by taking a decision making post where, still worse, he might have to listen to and indeed follow others.
Labor is not a serious rival. Jeremy Corbyn, like Nigel Farage, does not want ministerial responsibility. He has now been more than 36 years as a Member of Parliament, with the vast majority of that time spent without any additional burdens. His approach to affairs is always two-fold. He repeats a set of “convictions” that are personal. And at the group level insists that any decisions, within the Labor party or elsewhere, must be taken “democratically”, whatever that may mean. He is not an internationalist, in the sense of being ready and capable to engage on difficult issues outside the UK (or the Republic of Ireland).
It is true that he has often expressed much interest in Latin America, with each of his three wives coming from one of that continent’s countries. This author, who has spent years in those wonderful lands engaged very directly in some of their struggles, would indeed enjoy examining experiences there with him. But they are not England and relations between even the largest of them and England are nowadays weak. He is essentially an English nationalist, without being a populist. It is as if he believes in what an English historian called, referring to Stalin’s move away from internationalism in the 1920s, “socialism in one country”. He is not a leader. He will not remain in charge of the Labor party for too much longer. Maybe he goes before the next general election, or maybe he leaves shortly thereafter. Either way, Johnson knows that his presence has gifted political dominance to the conservatives, even though they are in a terrible condition.
At various periods, including in the first half of the present decade, the Liberal Democrat party has gathered enough votes to play a role in government. In the past days, it has gained members and opinion polls show that it is appearing on the screen to a larger extent than has hitherto been the case. But very strong doubts must remain as to the willingness of an English electorate to allow a fresh coalition. The Brexit period has in fact confirmed this. If ever a time was needed to form a national government, this was it. Yet Theresa May refused to listen, and thereby pursued the deliberate policy of deepening the all too visible cleavages in the country (exactly like the President of the USA, she preached unity but fostered division). Bojo has calculated that there will be no lasting damage caused by the Liberal Democrats, or indeed any other “new” parties.
A by no means insignificant share of Parliamentary seats go to constituencies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Of these, some are won in Northern Ireland by Sinn Fein, but those are never filled for the obvious reason that the individuals concerned cannot swear an oath of allegiance to the Queen. (Judging by the recent behavior of Bojo himself, and of David Cameron, it is nevertheless debatable whether Prime Ministers who have sworn that oath show the Monarch much respect). Of these three countries, only Wales voted in favor of Brexit. Right now, the English have to be asking themselves whether they want to continue with any variant of the so-called “Union”. The constant discussions about the “Irish backstop” in the context of Brexit, and the fact that till recent days the vote of the few Ulster Unionists has been useful to the government, have masked the fact that the real issue concerns the Union.
The Future of the UK and Constitutional Architecture
Is England facing a “Yeltsin Moment”? Has the country which has seen its empire disappear now reached the point where it should finally stand on its own, and seek to control its own affairs (unhindered by the often irritating behavior of different tribes’ right on its own borders)? This is a crucial question. What has for long been labelled “The Conservative and Unionist Party” might now be reaching the point where “Unionist” is dropped. The tiny set of people to whom the label matters passionately are not in fact English – they are the Ulster Unionists.
People like Bojo himself do not at all feel wedded to this. They are English through and through. No clearer demonstration of the separate worlds could have been given than when Theresa May a couple of years back named a new secretary for Northern Ireland. The lady in question had the remarkable honesty to state publicly that she had never been there (presumably this pleased Michael Gove in his quest to ensure that “experts” should never be entrusted with a job – here was a true amateur in the best English sense).
Any moves to end the Union will clearly take a considerable period of time. Bojo has a complex agenda, and will still have to convince the English to fully back an “England First” platform. Scotland will require a decision from its own people. Northern Ireland would face not only separation from the Union but would need to reach many agreements with the Republic of Ireland. Wales, always the low profile member of the trio, might want a special relationship with England. All of these countries would simultaneously have to sort out their desired links with other countries and places, including the EU.
There is scarcely any need to emphasize that constitutional issues include, and to some degree begin with, the question of who a constitutional reform is for. Is it for the UK as it is presently conceived? Is it for England alone, with a newly independent trio (namely the other countries of the current UK) required to decide their own structures? Or is it for something “in between”? But there is of course far more involved than territorial questions. The Brexit affair has stretched the democratic fabric to the limit. It has revealed all kinds of disputes, misunderstandings, voids within institutions and across them (meaning in their relations with each other). While a number of people and groups, often not directly involved in politics, have set out a number of things which “need fixing”, as far as this author is aware, nobody has yet proposed an overall vision and architecture within which “constitutional change” might be tackled.
Indeed, such a visionary architecture might, it could be argued, go against the English grain, which in politics as in the law has always sought to give plenty of scope to “common sense and pragmatism”. These are profound matters and Bojo might well want to leave them aside. But this could prove difficult to do. The proroguing of Parliament, a decision taken by him, has made the matter almost impossible to dodge. And his own reputation for mendacity has made his protestations that he is not being undemocratic difficult to accept. He might, of course, want to take England fully into a “new world”, something that could cement his place in posterity. But, gratifying as a place in posterity might sound, his main preoccupation is the here and now.
Arrangements with the EU
That here and now is, in the most direct sense, reaching some agreement with the EU. My hunch is that a fudge will be reached in the coming days. Why? The EU has few rivals when it comes to fudge production, that extremely valuable art of appearing to create something which in fact may not be tangible. Above all, it has a profound (and I think entirely comprehensible) aversion to direct conflicts of any kind. Bojo too stands to gain everything by being able to boast that he did indeed “conclude Brexit” (the phrase is of course meaningless – Brexit will still be around long after we are all dead). That way he kills off most political opposition at home. More important, he can claim to the population that (for once) he kept his word. And he can then go on to other things.
This much said, the content and taste of the fudge matters (as it does with most things of the culinary variety – an analogy with which Bojo is familiar). And, as with many foods, taste usually improves if the fudge is given time to cook properly. Unfortunately, time is now in desperately short supply. When extremely fast decisions are needed, the chances of reaching them are significantly enhanced if the partners to the negotiations trust each other. Bojo has regrettably made a reputation for not being particularly reliable. Politicians lie all the time, yet the pattern of lying, and who you lie to, is what counts. He is known for spectacular “volte-face”, and that’s a behavior that fellow politicians don’t like. Somehow, to mix the culinary metaphors, he will have to pull some chestnuts out of the fire if he wants to make fudge.
If this unlikely feat is managed, then the UK can look forward to many years of arduous negotiations in Europe, the continuance of many relations which it might not like, and eventually to paying the bills. Still, if Bojo can somehow persuade people to forget Brexit, fudge will do nicely.
Arrangements with the Rest of the World
The rhetoric surrounding Brexit has endlessly talked about trade deals with countries outside Europe. It has said virtually nothing about how the UK/England sees itself in a world that is changing extremely quickly and in unpredictable ways. Both issues have a major influence not only on economic and social welfare but also on the extent to which the country, however defined, can play an international role in the future.
A few simple facts about international economic affairs have to be clear at the outset. At this stage of the 21st century, and indeed since the establishment 25 years ago of the World Trade Organization, nobody makes “trade deals”. The whole point of negotiations is to “get behind the border”. Countries argue about everything from investment rules, to product standards, to health and safety considerations, to labor rules, to intellectual property, to public procurement, to environmental protection…. You name it, it will be the subject of contention. Old fashioned tariffs hardly come into it, except if you happen to be PROTUS.
Put differently, countries and regions negotiate with each other precisely to limit each other’s degrees of freedom to change rules unilaterally. That’s the condition for promoting enhanced exchange and interaction. If you want “Trade Deals”, then you have to be ready to accept rules over which other people exert very substantial influence. Anyone who is serious about “taking back control” ought to be really concerned about more “trade deals”. And they should be especially worried if those on the other side of the table are major economic powers, for instance China, India, USA, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, Japan, and Indonesia, not forgetting the EU. In short: the omnibus arrangements concluded nowadays are not for those who want to take back control.
But arrangements with other regions and countries encompass a whole kaleidoscope of subjects, of which commercial exchange, investment and the movement of people are just part. Many if not most of the things which occupy headlines go way beyond national borders. Climate change, security, environment, privacy, the exchange of scientific knowledge, tax evasion, transnational crime, money laundering, the organization of global sports events and artistic endeavors – all these are matters on which progress comes fastest when countries cooperate. To be successful in the cooperation game, it obviously helps if a country is perceived by others as highly competent and thus can add value to collective ventures (and the UK punches above its weight in that arena). Yet is also vital that a country be perceived as a reliable partner, likely to stick with the cooperation even if sometimes it has to learn from others.
What will be the future UK stance in this crucial area? Right now, there is only uncertainty. Indeed, the manufacture of uncertainty has been a defining feature of the past three years. The attitude “let’s keep everyone guessing” has been trumpeted as a clarion call of English superiority. It needs to be said very firmly that this attitude is highly counter-productive. It undermines trust, that crucial component of interactions in every branch of life. England is now performing poorly in the market for trust. Bojo himself has gleefully adopted the garb of someone who cannot be trusted. Unless that problem is tackled in the most incisive way, arrangements with other countries, whoever they are, will not be reached easily.
Future Policies and “Liberation”
More than most, he has sold the line that once it is “liberated”, England will be able to perform wonders. Bojo is explicitly claiming that he will move the country off what, in an English variation on a theme of Von Hayek, is seen as “the Brussels Road to Serfdom” and lead the country to a promised land. It’s as if the “Last Night of the Proms” clamor has become government policy. “Britons never, never, never will be slaves” and “Building the New Jerusalem in England’s green and pleasant land” have been rolled into one, conveniently overlooking the massive territorial dichotomy. What does this mean, in the prosaic world of real life? Not only will internal performance have to improve, but relations with third countries will have to do the same. Moreover, those relations will have to avoid new forms of cow-towing (for example, to the President of the USA, who is not liked even by many of the more rabid supporters of Brexit). Here too Bojo has to overcome, or persuade people to forget, many travesties of the facts which have been the stock in trade of the Brexit campaigners. In particular, two things will require demonstration.
First, if a comparison is made with EU countries, the overall economic performance of the UK over this century has not been at all bad. The ingrained and multiple inequalities have increased, yet the same is true for more or less any OECD country you care to name. In the UK case, the gradients of inequality across regions (a sharp north-south divide, with both eastern and western flanks of the two blocs faring worse than the central channels) were established following the first industrial revolution there. The within city problems were already only too visible in the time of Charles Dickens, and have persisted in various guises ever since (though not descending to the levels of the bidonvilles seen in France).
Palliative measures to disinfect the worst sores were taken at various periods, while most governments (save those of Margaret Thatcher) paid lip service to helping the poor (the CCC, or Cameron’s Compassionate Conservatism, was just the latest slogan, naturally to be contradicted by Osborne Austerity). But the point is that, measured on a comparative yardstick, the Brexiters effort to denigrate what has been accomplished is nonsense. To do a great deal better is asking for major improvements. And to claim (as is done) that these will be achieved through the sole device of changing EU law to some new -fangled “English edicts” defies reason.
Second, though the world of today and tomorrow is marked by high risks of all kinds, it does not follow that a Johnsonian government should fob this off by saying “so we are all in the same boat”. Bojo and those he has chosen to link up with have pinned three sails to the masts of their particular boat. One says that the English are superior. The second says that they will essentially navigate alone. The third says that, if there are any links with others, it’s the English who will pick the cherries. These “messages on the masts” read more as defiance than diplomacy. Maybe they will be seen in a good light by fellow “sovereigntists”, if not by many others.
But a core problem for sovereigntists is when they clash with each other. While they can agree on a third “common enemy”, then mutual back slapping is a great pastime. For instance, this very weekend the Italian sovereigntists welcomed Viktor Orban to speak at one of their meetings. Naturally everyone attacked the EU (inter alia). Yet they either overlooked, or did not realize, that their complaints were strikingly different. And the Italians somehow forgot to ask whether Hungary would take some of the people passing through Lampedusa. In the US context, a Johnsonian administration will have to manage the chlorinated chicken problem. The UK will not find that external relations can be conducted on its terms. On the contrary, the probabilities are that the fiercest clashes will not be with the EU at all, but with places where the nationalist sentiments are a defining feature of policy.
What about actual policy? Very little has been said. For a long time the depressingly London centric phrase “Singapore on the Thames” has been swirling around, and Bojo has at times associated himself with it. The notion appears to be that a low corporate tax regime will be instituted, and this will encourage foreign direct investment. In other words, fiscal incentives offered to businesses from around the world will more than replace the attraction to international value added chains that has been provided by being part of the EU Single Market. Insofar as the many economic analyses of Brexit have shed light on this specific matter, the prognoses are not at all favorable. The idea itself shows both a poor understanding of how international investment decisions work (a limitation reflecting the perspectives of a man who, in 2018, used quite impolite language to tell business what to do), and a similarly poor grasp of how Singapore operates – and why. Its trajectory, on separation from Malaysia, has been from exporter of goods intensive in low cost labor, to becoming an entrepot center for international trade from and to Asia Pacific, to developing itself as a world leader in logistics and a hub for knowledge and research (no doubt this fact was not lost on James Dyson as he chose to locate his new operations there). The English slogan risks the country going, at least partially, in reverse direction on that road.
This change in the “push and pull” for productive activity has fiscal as well as other consequences. Johnson is, in the pre-election atmosphere that prevails, currently racing around promising large scale handouts to more or less everyone. This is normal behavior for politicians (though to Jeremy Corbyn’s credit, he has at least been consistent and offered the same since he began in politics several decades back). The problem, as usual, is that the suggested policy towards the production system in England will significantly decrease fiscal revenues from corporations. Indeed, this is already happening as a number of firms have left because of the Brexit implications, so their fiscal contributions have emigrated with them.
The handouts are thus suggested in a context where the likely public revenue streams are under increasing pressure. Bojo recognizes that, in government, he cannot avoid the economic and social problems that have accumulated during the past decade. These problems have increased sharply since the 2016 referendum. Whereas before it was the budgetary austerity that affected everything (Wolfgang Schaeuble in Germany must have been surprised that his most devout follower, George Osborne, was an Englishman running financial affairs in a place not even part of the Eurozone), the past three years have been characterized by a total lack of government. The preoccupation with the EU has raised a generation of political ostriches, their heads stuck in the Brexit sands. All other issues, long present or of recent vintage, have simply been ignored. A “post Brexit” government will have to worry about a slew of social and economic deficits, and might need to increase public debt to do so.
As if this were not enough, segments of English economy and society (farmers, food processors, scientific communities, to name a few) have realized that leaving the EU means that their budgets will be decreased. They expect that this money will be replaced by English pounds provided by HM Treasury. That expectation is almost certain to be disappointed. The Johnsonian approach therefore seems to be “lets throw money at the problems”. Given the financial picture just sketched, this sounds suspiciously like his earlier boast that you could have your cake and eat it.
To be a fairly successful populist, you need to have some kind of base from which to work. The base can be internal, external or both. Trump can play with the power of the US economy and financial system behind him. That gives him plenty of leeway, and the room to make lots of mistakes. Viktor Orban runs a country where the sense of being Magyar has always run deep. He has also been able to manage it cleverly from a financial/social perspective, demonstrating that he could deliver on maintained well-being for ordinary families despite significant buffeting in the international financial turbulence. Putin has likewise been able to use the mineral wealth of Russia to provide some improvement at home (again in the face of exceptional volatility in the international economy and sustained economic sanctions) as well as giving people a renewed sense of pride in Russia.
What can Bojo do? His version of spring cleaning starts with tearing down many of the assets which England had, claiming that this is the only way to throw off the shackles imposed by the EU. The asset portfolio is then supposed to be reconstructed through a mix of encouraging a different set of foreigners (businesses and individuals) to come to the country, and there blend their money and talents with those of the English to build not only a clean house but a new one. To pull off the gamble requires at least two things in which Bojo is not lacking, namely self-confidence and optimism. These qualities are valuable for an individual. Whether they are enough to rebuild a whole nation is another matter.
