The late John Berger, a distinguished art critic, committed socialist and finally full-time shepherd in the Swiss Jura, once did a series for British Television on the ways we react to art. The series was subsequently published as a small book entitled “Ways of Seeing”. When I read/looked at the lavishly illustrated text, I found about halfway through a full -page reproduction of Van Gogh’s “Sunflowers”. I imagined that the following page would offer Berger’s analysis of the masterpiece. Instead, in hyper large typescript, were simply the words “SOON AFTER PAINTING THIS, VAN GOGH COMMITTED SUICIDE. DO YOU STILL SEE THE PICTURE IN THE SAME WAY?”
What we think we see, and how we say things, are strongly conditioned by what we believe we know. The “knowing” part should evolve, as we receive more information. Yet still our conception can be sharply slanted. Last Friday, 24 March, in Italy was a day of memorial for the so-called Ardeatine, the event of 1944 in Rome when over 300 people were murdered by the occupying Nazi forces. I have written “people”. Georgia Meloni, speaking about the tragedy, used the word “Italians”. But the Italian political opposition, along with many historians, emphasized that the people slaughtered were “anti- fascists”. The choice of word identifies the perception of the event. The Italian opposition is stressing that the persons were killed because they were anti-fascist. Yes, they were Italian, yet that is not the point. Given the extreme sensitivity in Italy to the term “fascist” (only President Putin speaks as much about it as does Italy), the Presidenta del Consiglio presumably chose the catch all word “Italians” to somehow imply that it was a national tragedy. For the opposition, the view of events is very different.
Today, national politics and global geopolitics are enormously influenced by ways of seeing and ways of saying. While a huge amount of time and energy has rightly been spent (and is being spent) on trying to cope with “fake news”, I would argue that the “perception challenge” is more insidious and more dangerous. In particular, I argue that the problem is exceptionally serious in the so-called democratic countries. Why? Because that group purports to defend liberties and human rights which dictatorial regimes systematically deny. To the extent that the former regard themselves as a beacon for people elsewhere, they need to be exceptionally careful that what they see, say and do is matched by their actual behavior. Let’s look at some examples to assess where things actually stand.
Close to 80 years ago, an entity called “The United Nations” was formed. While the term, taken literally, seemed to appeal to the highest ideals, the inherent problems were glaring. At that time, the number of nations was in fact only a few dozen (today its 193). Very shortly after the San Francisco founding meeting, the geopolitical split in Europe was consolidated. Progressively, while legal decolonization (frequently unaccompanied by liberal moves in a real sense) proceeded apace, various other international groupings were formed whose very names recognized that nations were far from “United” – the Non Aligned Movement is the most evident example. In more recent times the euphemism “international community” slid into use. But from the word go that phrase evidently referred only to a quite limited group of States. In effect, the ”International Community” was run by the US, UK, most Members of the EU, plus some other countries (particularly Canada, Australia and New Zealand). Broadly speaking, the countries mentioned considered themselves to share similar ideas and practices about how societies should be run, though perspectives on foreign policy were less common. These States, employing the well-known ruse of “diplomacy by terminology”, were effectively ordaining themselves as the high priests of virtue. This, exactly in a period when their own actions were mocking their words, and when the lived experiences of so many places in the world contradicted so many of the claims of virtue.
It seems to me no accident that, in retrospect, the high point of that “way of seeing” coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union -and that it is the actions of Russia today which have demonstrated just how restricted that way of seeing really is. The truth is that, in the 15 months since the Russian invasion of the Ukraine and the Chinese public announcement of a new “World Order”, the behavior of countries and peoples across the globe has revealed a wide diversity of attitudes. While it is true that a significant majority of countries in the UN (and at the UN) have been against Russia’s invasion, the “unity” more or less stops there. Sanctions have not been widely welcomed or deployed. In fact, quite a few places, keeping an eye on their own longer term as well as short term interests, have actively assisted in the avoidance of sanctions.
Reality, as seen from specific geographical locations with their own specific histories, demands that probably the majority of countries outside Europe seek to avoid overtly taking sides. Just a few short weeks ago, Josep Borrrell, the EU Chief for Foreign Policy, made a statement in the UN General Assembly where he sought to persuade countries that the conflict in the Ukraine was not “against Russia” but rather “for Western ideals”. Given the history experienced by most parts of the world, it is scarcely surprising that the plea has fallen on deaf ears.
Even if the spotlight is limited to Europe, the clashes in ways of seeing and ways of saying are likewise severe within the continent itself. Right now, for example, there is a strong thrust from the EU to broker a major improvement in relations between Serbia and Kosovo (which are regarded, in the EU vision of European geography, as part of “West Balkans”). Bearing in mind what happened in the 1990s, during the horrors accompanying the demise of Yugoslavia, it is fair to say that peoples there have at best mixed feelings about the erstwhile behavior of US and UK, and to a lesser extent Europe, in the region.
Kosovo is officially recognized by just under half of UN Member States whereas Serbia, within its current boundaries, is recognized by virtually all UN Member States. Thus, it is not difficult to understand why Serbia should feel that the standard “Western” depiction of its position amounts to misrepresentation. Furthermore, keep in mind that, since the 1914-1918 maelstrom, the whole region was essentially a European affair (including Russia/Soviet Union) until the US intervened in a major way in the mid -1990s. Now it is again Western Europe which is occupying the stage. Throughout, however, a person in the region must surely have felt that all those on the outside (Russians included) regarded their homelands as at best sources of potential disturbance to the plans of those with geopolitical power. Is it not the case that the historical “ways of seeing” remain ingrained?
Still in Europe, a different example. The political operators in the EU, as they go through the perpetual grind of meetings relating to the myriad problems before them, are in fact all focused on one thing – jostling for their own positions following the 2024 elections to the EU Parliament and the changes they will perforce bring. Amidst the hectic maneuvering, the Estonian Prime Minister has rightly made a clarion call, to wit, its time the top posts went to people from the key group of Central and East European countries which joined the EU nigh on 20 years back
She is absolutely right. Her call is not simply a call for fairness (though that is there too). It is above all a call for realism. Aside from the (very important) fact that these countries are in the direct path of Russian behavior, they are also the countries which have, over the past 3 decades, gone through massive changes of all kinds. They are the places where astonishing shifts in perspective, in ways of seeing, have been achieved. If the EU is to have a fresh approach, the drive will come only to a very limited extent from the original Member States. The true dynamism will come from the North and the East of Europe (since the writer of these lines is Irish and Spanish, the compass points mentioned have not been chosen lightly – my countries have both performed wonderfully in the past decades and continue to do so, but the real “’paradigm shift” will emanate from the Baltics and Central Europe).
The remarks in the preceding paragraphs have focused on the serious difficulties we all face, whether as individuals or within institutions, in modifying or even discarding the ways we have been seeing and talking about the world. Yet there is a further, and equally complex task – to try and understand how countless others may view us. Simplifying hugely, lets look at just three kinds of countries.
To begin with, take that group of countries which have considerable power, whether in general or because of assets they possess. Roughly speaking, for historical reasons most of those countries will likely be highly suspicious of the US, and pretty sceptical when thinking of the larger EU countries, mainly France and Germany. Actions in their regard will have to be taken with extreme pragmatism. Then there is a vast group of countries many of which have suffered from European and/or American colonialism. Relations with them should strive to build genuine cooperation and collaboration, yet without sacrificing to reactionary forces within those countries. Put differently, regimes which install dictatorships should still not be treated as great friends. Finally, there is a very small group of countries who are looking for real friends. Here Australia is perhaps the key example. It is a continent, replete with natural resources, with institutions built on European ideas, yet located in a region of the world where conflicts are rife. It is at risk of finding itself isolated, in the sense of active allies, unless proactive steps are taken by friendly countries. In short, it is the place where different ways of seeing do not represent a major obstacle to improvement.
It is to me striking that China affirms non-interference of other countries in a country’s internal affairs as a core tenet of its foreign policy. It is true that there can be legitimate discussion about what constitutes interference and that the application of that tenet in the Ukraine conflict is hard to discern. However, the deeper meaning of non-interference is crucial. Colonialism and its contemporary sequels have practiced “ingerence” to the nth degree. Hard though it may be to say this, everything from the naked use of military force to the operations of humanitarian organizations can be regarded, from certain optics, as interference. Because of the past, the eye is suspicious, and the ear is not sure if it has heard correctly.
So, we are at a crossroads. The constant movement of migrants towards Europe and USA and, to some degree, Canada and Australia, along with the numbers who have fled Russia since the invasion of the Ukraine, suggests that there are plenty of people who are none too happy where they are. With the exception of those leaving Russia, very few of these migrants seem to come from countries which currently possess significant power and strong internal regimes. Realpolitik remains the battleground of inter-State rivalry while individuals and families mostly head for where they can prosper more. These are the terrains where the perception struggle is being fought.
Peter O’Brien, Brussels, 27 March 2023
